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THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS ACT: THE KING CAN
DO "LITTLE" WRONG
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (the "Act" or tlie "TCA") is the
primary vehicle by which the state may be held liable for injuries caused
by the negligence of its employees. The Act is so interwoven with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity that the two cannot be separated. This
article examines all case law associated with the TCA from the Act's
1975 inception through August 1990. Part I of this article introduces the
doctrine of sovereign immunity' and sets forth the basic components of
the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 2 Part II identifies and discusses the3
threshold issues that have surfaced during the TCA's fifteen-year lifespan.
from
Part III analyzes each of the eight government activities exempt
immunity and sets out the contours of the existing case law. 4 Part IV
discusses the federal and state constitutional issues associated with the
Act. 5 Finally, Part V examines the relationship between the Act and a
42 U.S.C. section 1983 action for deprivation of civil rights under either
the United States Constitution or federal law. 6
I.

INTRODUCTION

A History of Sovereign Immunity
Traditional governmental immunity exempts all levels of government
from legal suits against the government and its entities. 7 This immunity,
referred to as sovereign immunity, is based on the historical notion that
the divine ruler is free from error and, hence, free from legal accountability. 8
The precise point at which the concept of sovereign immunity was
born is impossible to pinpoint, but some basis for it exists in Roman
0
law. 9 Exemplified by the axiom that "the King could do no wrong,"'
sovereign immunity crossed the English Channel very early in England's
history and became deeply embedded in British common law." "Before

A.

1. See infra text accompanying notes 7-34.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 48-169.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 170.341.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 342-93.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 394-424.
7. See generally Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Davis,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. Rav. 751 (1956).
8. See Borchard, supra note 7.
9. Id. at 8. For further discussion, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HAgv. L. REv. 209 (1963).
10. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 458-69 (5th ed. 1942). The meaning and
significance of this phrase has been twisted and misunderstood. Pugh, Historical Approach to the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953).
11. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788) ("[l~t is better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.").
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the sixteenth century, sovereign immunity was a purely personal right of
the kings of England ....
The king, the highest feudal lord, enjoyed
No court was above him. ' 1 2
[protection from suit in his own courts] ....
The English common law, including the notion of immunity for the
sovereign, was firmly transplanted to the American colonies. 3 Although
immunity was readily applied to the federal government, the early cases
accepting sovereign immunity failed to provide reasons for applying the
doctrine. In the early twentieth century, Justice Holmes articulated the
most commonly quoted explanation of sovereign immunity: "A sovereign
is exempt . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law in which that
' 4
right depends.'
Just as the United States Government was imbued with sovereign
immunity, so too were the governments of the several states. 5 Whether
it be the federal government, or one of the various state governments,
it was "a fundamental doctrine at common law and everywhere in America
that no sovereign state [could] be sued in its own courts or in any other
6
without its consent and permission.'1
B.

Sovereign Immunity in New Mexico
New Mexico courts recognized common law sovereign immunity from
the beginning of statehood until 1975. 7 New Mexico's "judicial acceptance
of . . . immunity . . . [was] substantially based on reluctance to permit
invasion of the public coffers from the satisfaction of liability judgments
instead of for the public purpose for which they were appropriated.' 8
Thus, neither the state nor municipalities functioning in their governmental
capacities could be sued without their consent and permission. 9 A victim
of the tortious conduct of a public employee or of a government entity
was required to bear the burden of loss alone without recompense from
the wrongdoer.
Complicating application of the doctrine, possibly in an attempt to
mitigate its harsh consequences, New Mexico courts exempted "propri-

12. Lawyer, Birth and Death of Government of Immunity, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 529 (1966)
(Although the King's courts had no jurisdiction to hear claims against him, the Court of Exchequer
had jurisdiction to provide -equitable relief against the crown.).
13. Although sovereign immunity appears best suited to royalty, the doctrine was nonetheless
accepted by American judges in the early days of the republic. Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (United States
cannot be sued without its permission); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792)
(The holding that a citizen of one state could sue another state resulted in enactment of the eleventh
amendment to the United States Constitution that prohibits a federal court from hearing a suit
brought against a state.).
14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
15. Pugh, supra note 10.
16. Dougherty v. Vidal, 37 N.M. 256, 257-58, 21 P.2d 90, 91 (1933) (citation omitted).
17. For an excellent review of sovereign immunity in New Mexico, see Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign
and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REv. 249 (1976).
18. Kovnat, supra note 17, at 249-50.
19. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323, cert. denied,
411 U.S. 938 (1973).
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functions of municipalities from immunity while allowing gov-

ernmental or "discretionary" functions to fall within the doctrine.
Considerable litigation arose as plaintiffs attempted to bring their cause
of action within the definition of a proprietary function. 20 The construction
and
and maintenance of streets, 2' the construction and repair of sewers
23 were
22
pool
swimming
a
municipal
of
operation
the
and
plants,
sewage

all classified as proprietary functions. Any negligence associated with
those functions was actionable. On the other hand, the operation of a
police department, 24 the installation of stop signs, 25 and the maintenance

of roads 26 were all governmental, or discretionary, activities immunized
against suit.

Just as the courts sought to soften the doctrine's harshness, so too

did the New Mexico Legislature. The legislature provided limited consent
to sue the state for the recovery of damages for death, personal injury,
or property damage resulting from the negligence of a state entity or

employee. 2 A judgment, however, could not lie against the state unless
2

there was liability insurance to cover the amount and cost of the judgment. 8
Although both the New Mexico Legislature and the courts altered the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to some extent, these modifications did
not satisfy the demands of modern society. Regardless of the recognized
exemptions to governmental immunity, most victims of government negligence went uncompensated. The manifest injustice of the doctrine, as
well as the ever-expanding litigation surrounding proprietary and discre-

tionary functions, inevitably led to judicial abandonment of sovereign
immunity.

In 1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Hicks v. State,29 brought

New Mexico in line with the federal government 0 and a number of other
states3 when it abolished common law sovereign immunity for tort actions

against New Mexico government entities. Calling sovereign immunity a
"legal anachronism," the court noted that the doctrine was no longer

justifiable.3 2 The court dwelt upon the injustice of requiring a single

20. See, e.g., Latimer v. City of Clovis, 83 N.M. 610, 495 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1972).
21. Primus v. City of Hot Springs, 57 N.M. 190, 256 P.2d 1065 (1953).
22. Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).
23. Latimer, 83 N.M. at 610, 495 P.2d at 788.
24. Barnett v. Cal M, Inc., 79 N.M. 553, 445 P.2d 974 (1968).
25. Hammell v. City of Albuquerque, 63 N.M. 374, 320 P.2d 384 (1958).
26. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 88 N.M. 180, 538 P.2d 1202 (1975).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-18 to. -22 (Repl. Pamp. 1966) (repealed 1975).
28. Id.; see also Public Officers and Employees Liability Act ("POELA"), N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5-13-1 to -17 (Supp. 1975). While short-lived, the POELA provided that a state entity or a
municipality could waive immunity by purchasing insurance or by filing a notice of election of
waiver of immunity and provided immunity for proprietary functions of a municipality if the
municipality did not waive immunity.
29. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
30. See Federal Tort Claims Act, current provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504,
2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680 (1982).
31. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 25A (1989 & Supp. 1990). The Iowa Tort Claims Act, modeled on
the Federal Tort Claims Act, was enacted in 1965. For a list of states that had abolished sovereign
immunity by 1975, see Hicks, 88 N.M. at 593, 544 P.2d at 1158.
32. Hicks, 88 N.M. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155.
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individual, who suffers an injury by reason of a government tort, to
carry the entire burden of the injury.33 The harsh results of the doctrine
were no longer acceptable in a modern republic.'
C.

The New Mexico Tort Claims Act
The following year, the New Mexico Legislature responded to the
judiciary's abolition of common law sovereign immunity by enacting the
Tort Claims Act." The possibility of unlimited government liability posed
by the abolition of common law sovereign immunity was not something
the state was willing to assume. 6 The Act reinstated sovereign immunity
for government entities and public employees acting within the scope of
their duties.37 The legislature declared that it reinstated sovereign immunity
because "the area within which the government has the power to act
for the public good is almost without limit ... ,3 Impliedly, the legislature enacted the TCA to shield the public treasury from liability
judgments.3 9
On the other hand, the legislature acknowledged the "unfair and
inequitable results'"'4 of a strict application of sovereign immunity. Attempting to balance individual rights with state interests, the legislature
carved out eight limited classes of governmental activities that are not
.
immune from liability. 4'

33. Id. at 591, 544 P.2d at 1156.
34. Id. The court quoted Justice Cardozo:
'A rule which in its origins was the creation of the courts themselves, and was
supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by
the courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would
do violence to the social conscience.'
Id. at 592, 544 P.2d at 1157 (citing CARDozo, THE GRowTH oF THE LAW 136-37 (1924)) (emphasis
in original).
35. Currently codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -29 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The TCA provides for "immunity from
liability, and not absolute immunity from suit .. " Allen v. Board of Educ. of Albuquerque, 106
N.M. 673, 675, 748 P.2d 516, 518 (Ct. App. 1987).
Notably, while the courts prefer that a claim of immunity be raised as an affirmative defense
or in a motion to dismiss, it may be "raised for the first time even upon appeal," Hern v. Christ,
105 N.M. 645, 648, 735 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 644, 735 P.2d 1150
(1987), or "by the court on its own motion." Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 486, 723 P.2d 252,
255 (Ct. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smialek v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d
1306 (1986).
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
39. See also infra notes 376-93 and accompanying text.
40. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
41. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-5 to -12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The legislature waived immunity
for bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by negligence of public employees
while acting within the scope of their duties in the: (1) "operation or maintenance of any motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft," § 41-4-5; (2) "operation or maintenance of any building, public
park, machinery, equipment or furnishings," § 41-4-6; (3) "operation of airports," § 41-4-7; (4)
"operation of public utilities and services such as gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid
waste
collection or disposal, heating, and ground transportation," § 41-4-8; (5) "operation of any hospital,
infirmary, mental institution, clinic, dispensary, medical care home or like facilities," § 41-4-9; (6)
"provision of health care services," § 41-4-10; and (7) "maintenance of or for the existence of
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Notably, a number of states have employed the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in a strikingly different manner. Rather than statutorily impose
sovereign immunity wholesale and then carve out exceptions to that
immunity, a few state legislatures exempted certain governmental actions
from liability but retained accountability for the large bulk of governmental activities. 42
The path the New Mexico Legislature chose, on the other hand, appears
contrary to its stated intent to relieve the "unfair and inequitable results"
of the doctrine's application. Indeed, as this article will demonstrate, the
result of New Mexico's choice has been increased litigation as injured
claimants attempt to define their injuries so that they fit within one of
the exempted classes of governmental action. Plaintiffs' attempts to fit
within the framework of the Act are understandable. The Act is the
exclusive remedy for an individual injured by a government entity's or
public employee's negligence.43 A cause of action against a government
entity or public employee resulting from a tort occurring within the scope45
of its duties must fit within one of the exceptions" found in the Act.
Otherwise, an injured claimant has no remedy at law.4 Moreover, if a
plaintiff's cause of action does fit within one of the exceptions for which

any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area," § 41-4-10.
The legislature also waived immunity for personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death or property
damage caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties "resulting
from assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, defamation of character, violation of property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or the constitution and
laws of New Mexico." § 41-4-12.
In addition to immunity from tort actions, government entities are granted immunity from actions
based on constructive or implied contract theories. Sovereign immunity is waived, however, for
actions based upon a valid written contract. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). But
see Hydro Conduit Corp. v. New Mexico Pub. Safety Dep't, 110 N.M. 173, 793 P.2d 855 (1990)
(claim for unjust enrichment is an action based on contract within the grant of immunity to
government entities under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23).
Some actions, however, impose liability on the state without coming under the TCA or under a
contract action. For example, an action based upon inverse condemnation against a municipality
is permitted because inverse condemnation is not a common law tort action, and the TCA is not
the exclusive remedy. McClure v. Town of Mesilla, 93 N.M. 447, 448, 601 P.2d 80, 81 (Ct. App.
1979).
42. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 25A (1989 & Supp. 1990) (Iowa's Tort Claims Act).
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-17(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see also Methola v. County of Eddy,
95 N.M. 329, 334, 622 P.2d 234, 239 (1980) ("The right to sue and any recovery under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act is limited to the rights, procedures, limitations and conditions prescribed
in that Act.").
A cause of action for deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities granted under the federal
constitution or laws, however, still lies regardless of whether the TCA waives immunity. Even though
a plaintiff may have no claim under the Tort Claims Act, she can still pursue a 42 U.S.C. section
1983 claim arising out of the same facts. The federal remedy is supplemental to the state remedy.
Wells v. County of Valencia, 98 N.M. 3, 7, 644 P.2d 517, 521 (1982); see infra notes 394-424 and
accompanying text.
44. See supra note 41.
45. Martinez v. Kaune Corp., 106 N.M. 489, 490, 745 P.2d 714, 715 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
106 N.M. 439, 744 P.2d 912 (1987) (citation omitted).
46. Id. Even if other statutes impose certain duties upon government agencies, if a breach of
those duties does not come within at least one of the exceptions to the Act, a claimant has no
cause of action. Cozart v. Town of Bernalillo, 99 N.M. 737, 663 P.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1983).
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immunity has been waived, the plaintiff reaps the benefit of a "deep
pocket" because the agency that caused the harm is liable for damages
caused by the acts and omissions of its employees. 7
II.

THRESHOLD PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A number of threshold procedural issues are apparent from the litigation
surrounding the Act. The constitutionality of the Act's notice provisions
occupied several courts.4 Questions regarding the statute of limitations 49
and naming the proper party defendant 0 arose fairly early in the Act's
history. More recently, the constitutionality of the TCA's damage cap
has been challenged, 5' and the supreme court has defined a "single

occurrence."

52

A.

Notice of Claim
The plaintiff claiming damages against the state or any local public
body under the TCA must notify the state or local public body in writing
within ninety days of the occurrence giving rise to liability.53 Notice must
be given to the state's risk management division or specified public

47. Martinez, 106 N.M. at 490, 745 P.2d at 715 (citation omitted); see also N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-4-4(B), (C), (D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). "Liability for acts or omissions . .. [is] based upon the
traditional tort concepts of duty and the reasonably prudent person's standard of care in the
performance of that duty." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
When enacting the TCA, the legislature also professedly abolished the judicially created distinctions
between governmental "proprietary" functions and "ministerial" functions. Id. These distinctions,
however, appear to be creeping back into the analysis employed by the courts when interpreting
the Act. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see infra notes 53-111 and accompanying
text.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see infra notes 112-22 and accompanying
text. Just as the limitation period acts to forestall endless future litigation, a settlement in an action
under the TCA constitutes a complete bar to any action by the claimant. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 414-17(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); Sugarman v. City of Las Cruces, 95 N.M. 706, 708, 625 P.2d 1223,
1225 (Ct. App. 1980).
50. See infra notes 147-69 and accompanying text.
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Rep!. Pamp. 1989). This section provides a maximum liability
of $300,000 "to any person for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence," or
$500,000 "for all claims arising out of a single occurrence." See infra notes 376-93 and accompanying
text.
Further, section 41-4-2(B) provides that the "determination of the standard of care required in
any particular instance should be made with the knowledge that each government entity has financial
limitations within which it must exercise authorized power and discretion in determining the extent
and nature of its activities." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Arguably, this
section may limit the standard of care imposed upon the government and thus limit the amount
recoverable, notwithstanding the maximum liability limits. Yet, government entities have a duty to
insure against those risks granted a waiver of immunity. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-20(A) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989).
Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot recover postjudgment interest from a state entity. Fought v. State,
107 N.M. 715, 716, 764 P.2d 142, 143 (Ct. App. 1988). However, recovery of costs is permitted.
Kirby v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 97 N.M. 692, 699, 643 P.2d 256, 263 (Ct. App.), cert.
quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
52. See infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
53. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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officials.14 Such notice is not required,5 however, if the government entity
has actual notice of the occurrence.
The notice provision, which speaks in jurisdictional terms,5 6 provides
that a state district court always has jurisdiction if the government
defendant has actual notice; however, if the plaintiff does not comply
with the notice provisions of the Act, state courts may not hear the
suit.57 Thus, notice is a jurisdictional condition precedent to any suit or
statute
action against the state. 58 The notice provision also operates as a 59
of limitations because it is a condition precedent to filing a suit. Yet,6
at the same time, the Act also provides a two-year statute of limitations. 0
Four state interests justifying the notice requirement have been identified: (1) to enable the person or entity to whom notice must be given,
or its insurance company, to investigate the matter while the facts are
accessible; (2) to question witnesses; (3) to protect against simulated or
aggravated claims; and (4) to consider whether to pay the claim or to
refuse it.6I It seems, however, that the two-year statute of limitations
would serve nicely to meet these state interests.
The TCA statute of limitations 62 requiring that legal action be commenced within two years, 63 apart from the notice requirement, already
54. Id.
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The Act provides:
No suit or action for which immunity has been waived under the Tort Claims Act
shall be maintained and no court shall have jurisdiction to consider any suit or
action against the state or any local public body unless notice has been given as
required by this section, or unless the government entity had actual notice of the
occurrence.
Actual or constructive notice is not imputed simply because a state entity creates a danger giving
rise to a claim. Knowledge of a defect that might cause an accident is not notice of an accident
giving rise to government liability. See Cardoza v. Town of Silver City, 96 N.M. 130, 132, 628
P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686 (1981).
56. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
57. Id. The manner in which the courts have interpreted this provision is somewhat confusing.
Whether notice is given or received is a fact question for the trier of fact. Smith v. Department
of Parks & Recreation, 106 N.M. 368, 371, 743 P.2d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[Wjhether or
not notice has been given or received is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."
(citation omitted). On the other hand, whether "written notice is sufficient is a question for the
court." (emphasis added)).
58. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). This written notice requirement does
not apply to public employees. Martinez v. City of Clovis, 95 N.M. 654, 656, 625 P.2d 583, 585
(Ct. App. 1980). If a judgment is rendered against a public employee, however, and the affected
government entity has not been notified of the suit prior to judgment, the entity is not responsible
for paying the judgment. Otero v. State, 105 N.M. 731, 733, 737 P.2d 90, 92 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 105 N.M. 707, 736 P.2d 985 (1987).
59. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 197, 656 P.2d 244, 247
(Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889 (1983) (citation omitted).
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
61. Ferguson, 99 N.M. at 196, 656 P.2d at 246 (citation omitted).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
63. At least one jurisdiction has interpreted its TCA notice requirement, as applied to minors,
to mean that giving notice is the commencement of the action. An Idaho court held that its TCA
statute of limitations, regulating the period for bringing the action, controlled. Doe v. Durtschi,
110 Idaho 466, 477, 716 P.2d 1238, 1249 (1986) ("The filing of the notice of claim is an integral
part of the initiation of an action against a government entity."). The court found Idaho's general
tolling statute, and the legislative reasoning behind it, persuasive. That general tolling statute, much
like New Mexico's, allows waiver of the limitation period for legal disability.
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protects state entities and officials from stale claims and gives them an
opportunity to investigate while the facts are accessible." Further, the
Act's statute of limitations allows state entities and officials to question
witnesses in the same way as it protects them from stale claims. In fact,
the odds are actually in favor of the government in investigating claims
or questioning witnesses because local governments have police depart-

ments, attorneys and other personnel at their disposal to investigate the
causes and effects of accidents, which private claimants do not have. 65
And, because plaintiffs bear the burden of proving negligence, any difficulty in obtaining proof because notice is not timely given besets plaintiffs
as well as the defendant state entity or official."

The notice requirement does not materially protect against simulated

or aggravated claims. "The extent of a person's injuries is often unknown

for months .... "167 A person's injuries are proven from medical records
and medical opinion. The field of medicine has not reached the point
where a physician can always "confidently pinpoint ...

the specific

injury of a patient." Nor can a physician always "make an accurate
prognosis." 69 Requiring notice within ninety days, or within 180 days for
an incompetent person, does nothing whatsoever to either confirm the
extent of a person's injuries or protect the state from simulated or

aggravated claims. Reliance upon the statute of limitations to protect
state interests, rather than the notice requirement, would not substantially

compromise the government's interest in protecting against simulated or
aggravated claims.

The decision whether to pay the claim or to refuse it can be made
regardless of the notice requirement. State entities and officials have the
decisionmaking prerogative in this regard. Because a person's injuries are
often unknown for months, and settlement is unlikely under such cir-

cumstances, it appears to make no material difference in the outcome
70
whether the injured person has given notice.

The purposes of the notice requirement are not reasonably related to
the classification scheme it establishes. 7' The notice requirement appears
64. Accord Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1986) (construing Iowa
Tort Claims Act and 60 day notice requirement: "The general statute of limitations would protect
local governments from stale claims in the same manner as it protects the private sector.").
65. Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 539 P.2d 845, 849 (1975)
(citation omitted).
66. Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 34, 492 P.2d 1335, 1340 (1972) (Ellett, J.,
dissenting).
67. Miller, 394 N.W.2d at 780.
68. Id. (quoting Estate of Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 581-82 (Iowa 1986)).
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. See Miller, 394 N.W.2d at 780.
71. Accord Miller, 394 N.W.2d at 780 ("[These interests no longer furnish any rational basis
justifying the classification resulting" from the notice requirement ....
We conclude such arbitrary
treatment violates the equal protection guarantees of our federal and state constitutions."); Reich
v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617,
-,
194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972) (the notice requirement
"bears no reasonable relationship under today's circumstances to the recognized purpose of the
act"); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230,
-, 510 P.2d 879, 881 (1973) (notice requirement has no
rational basis), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973) ; O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504
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to be only a trap for the unwary. Predictably, both the notice provision
and the possible tolling of the provision have been the subject of litigation.
1. Notice

The sufficiency of notice to a government entity has been an issue in

a number of cases. In City of Las Cruces v. Garcia,72 the plaintiff named
the City of Las Cruces as a defendant in an action for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident." The city challenged the plaintiff's compliance
with the TCA notice requirement.7 4 Although the city traffic department
received a copy of the accident report, 75 the report contained no information about a claim or potential claim against the city. 76 The court
held that, in the absence of information that the city "may be subject
7
to a lawsuit," the plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice provision.7
The court clearly was concerned that proper notice would motivate the
city to investigate the incident and to possibly seek to settle the case
before litigation costs were incurred. This general theme runs through
all of the cases construing the Act's notice provision.
For example, in Smith v. Department of Parks & Recreation,71 the
plaintiff spoke with various employees of the Department of Parks &

(W. Va. 1977) (there is no rational basis for the notice requirement).
The TCA notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any suit. So, too, is the statutory
commission review established by the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1989); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 485, 697 P.2d 482, 485 (1985),
overruled sub nom., Grantland v. Lea Regional Hosp., Inc., 100 N.M. 378, 796 P.2d 599 (1990)
(statute of limitations tolled during pendancy of complaint before the review commission).
The Medical Malpractice Act requires that prior to an action being brought in court, the plaintiff
must submit the grievance for commission review. Id. The court, concerned that the plaintiff would
be precluded from bringing suit on statute of limitations grounds if required to go before the review
commission, held that the requirement was a "purely procedural requirement and [could] not,
therefore, be deemed binding" because the judicial branch had the exclusive prerogative to establish
procedural rules. Id. at 486, 697 P.2d at 486. The court noted that in a similar action it held that
"[blecause unbending adherence to the timing requirements of the Act would likely have eliminated
plaintiff's right of action there ... such strict application of the Act would unconstitutionally
infringe on plaintiff's right of access to the courts." Id. at 485, 697 P.2d at 485. Further, in Jiron
v. Mahlar, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated, "when a
plaintiff is required to resort to a state-created procedure, the procedure must not vitiate his right
of access to the courts." Id. at 427, 659 P.2d at 313. In both Otero and Jiron, the court allowed
the plaintiffs to bring an action prior to submitting their claims for commission review, contrary
to the express provisions of the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act, to avoid problems with the
statute of limitations. Arguably, at least in the case of persons unable to give timely notice, New
Mexico courts may be persuaded to employ the same analysis with the TCA notice requirement as
they have employed with the Medical Malpractice Act.
72. 102 N.M. 25, 690 P.2d 1019 (1984).
73. Id. at 26, 690 P.2d at 1020.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 27, 690 P.2d at 1021.
77. Id. (quoting New Mexico State Highway Comm'n v. Ferguson, 98 N.M. 680, 681, 652 P.2d
230, 231 (1982) (emphasis omitted)). The court did acknowledge that under some circumstances a
police report may serve as actual notice as contemplated in section 41-4-16(B), "but only where
the report contains information which puts the government entity allegedly at fault on notice that
there is a claim against it." Id. (emphasis in original); see also Frappier v. Mergler, 107 N.M. 61,
752 P.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1988) (accident report not sufficient to give adequate notice to village).
78. 106 N.M. 368, 743 P.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1987).
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Recreation and informed them that he believed the department's lack of
supervision had directly resulted in the boating accident deaths of six
individuals and that legal action was a possibility. 9 In the absence of
written notice of a claim, the issue before the court was whether plaintiff's
conversations with department employees met the actual notice requirement of the Act.80 The court explained that the statute only requires the
government to be given notice of "a likelihood that litigation may ensue." 8 Notice of possible litigation is required to alert the affected entity
to "the necessity of investigating the merits of a potential claim against
'
it."82 The notice does not have to contain information that a suit will
be filed, only that litigation is contemplated. 3
2. Tolling
The Act provides that "[t]he time for giving notice does not include
the time, not exceeding ninety days, during which the injured person is
incapacitated from giving notice by reason of injury. '8 4 The courts have
addressed issues concerning how to calculate the time when the notice
period begins to run and what conditions merit tolling of the notice
requirement.
In 'Emery v. University of New Mexico Medical Center,85 the parents
of a child who suffered brain damage because of the negligent care
provided by the state university medical center brought an action under
the TCA.8 6 The parents gave written notice of their claim approximately
eleven months after the incident causing the infant's brain damage, but
within two months of being apprised of the damage and the likely reason
for it.87 The court of appeals looked to the construction of the New
Mexico Workers' Compensation Act notice provision and to statute of
limitations cases for assistance in determining when the time period for
notice begins to run.88 The court noted the similarity between the TCA
notice provision and that of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation
Act notice provision 89 and said both provisions should be similarly in-

79. Id. at 370, 743 P.2d at 126.
80. Id. Notice is sufficient if it ensures that the government entity will investigate the claim
regardless of to whom the notice is given. Martinez v. City of Clovis, 95 N.M. 654, 625 P.2d 583
(Ct. App. 1980) (notice to an insurance adjuster acting for the city satisfies the TCA notice provision).
81. Smith, 106 N.M. at 371, 743 P.2d at 127.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. The court held that whether there is sufficient actual notice is a question of fact for
the jury and, if disputed, precludes summary judgment. Id.
84. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15
(Repl. Pamp. 1989), which tolls the TCA's statute of limitations for minority.
85. 96 N.M. 144, 628 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1981).
86. Id. at 146, 628 P.2d at 1142.
87. Id. at 148, 628 P.2d at 1144.
88. Id.
89. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). This section provides:
A. Any workman claiming to be entitled to compensation from any employer
shall give notice in writing to his employer of the accident and of the injury within
thirty days after their occurrence; unless, by reason of his injury or some other
cause beyond his control, the workman is prevented from giving notice within that

Summer 1991]

NEW MEXICO

TORT CLAIMS ACT

terpreted. 9 Because an occurrence does not give rise to a claim until
there is an injury, 9' the time period for notice does 92not start to run until
the injury is physically manifest and ascertainable.
Just as the time period is tolled until the injury is known, so too the
notice period is tolled for infancy. In Tafoya v. Doe,93 a mother brought
a negligence suit on behalf of herself and her infant daughter against
Carrie Tingley Hospital and one of its employees. 94 The hospital asserted
that the mother had given notice subsequent to the expiration of the
notice period and thus both mother and child were prevented from bringing

suit. 95 The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital based
96

on plaintiff's failure to give notice within the statutory time period.
The court of appeals agreed that the mother did not provide timely
written notice, 97 but disagreed as to the child. 9 The court noted that the
Act fails to provide for tolling of an infant's claim and also fails to

make provision for notice on an infant's behalf. 99 Because the notice
provisions "operate as statutes of limitations,"' 100 the provision must be
read in conjunction with the general statute of limitations exceptions to

preserve the rights of minors.' 0 ' An infant unable to comply with the

notice requirement "is protected by the reasonableness requirements of
the common law, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution, or similar provisions in their state constitutions."'' 0 2 The court
held that application of the notice provision to an infant "in the absence

of ... providing for notice on baby's behalf ... is unreasonable and
violates due process"' 0 3 because the TCA fails to provide for those unable

to comply with its requirements by reason of minority.)

4

The infant's

cause of action, therefore, must be governed by the Act's statute of

limitations, not the notice provision. 05

New Mexico appellate courts have not considered whether the time
period for notice is equally unconstitutional for incompetent individuals

time, in which case he shall give notice as soon as may reasonably be done, and
at all events not later than sixty days after the occurrence of the accident.
B. No written notice is required to be given where the employer or any superintendent or foreman or other agent in charge of the work in connection with
which the accident occurred had actual knowledge of its occurrence.
90. Emery, 96 N.M. at 147, 628 P.2d at 1143.
91. Id. at 149, 628 P.2d at 1145.
92. Id.
93. 100 N.M. 328, 670 P.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1983).
94. Id.at 329, 670 P.2d at 583.
95. Id. at 330, 670 P.2d at 584.
96. Id.
97. Id. On the other hand, the court noted that the infant's hospital records documented the
incident giving rise to injury and might be sufficient to meet the actual notice requirement. Id.
98. Id. at 329-31, 670 P.2d at 583-85.
99. Id. at 331, 670 P.2d at 585.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 331-32, 670 P.2d at 585-86.
102. Id. at 332, 670 P.2d at 586.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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who are unable to give notice within the statutory time period. °0 Incompetent individuals who are represented by attorneys, however, are
held to the strict notice requirements.
In Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Commission,' °7 a personal
representative of two incompetent individuals brought an action to recover
for injuries sustained in an accident."01 The incompetent individuals retained counsel prior to the expiration of the six-month notice period.' °9
The court held that, absent a showing that counsel acting on behalf of
plaintiffs could not give notice within the time period, the plaintiffs' due
process rights were not violated and the trial court properly dismissed
their complaint."10 The court suggested that a showing of impossibility
to give notice might be sufficient to toll the notice requirement for
incompetent individuals."'
B.

Statute of Limitations
The TCA provides a two-year limitations period in which to commence
a suit."12 The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the injury
manifests itself in a "physically objective manner and is ascertainable."" ' 3
Compliance with the statute is jurisdictional."14 New Mexico courts may
not hear suits brought after the expiration of the two-year time period.

106. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
107. 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889
(1983).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 196, 656 P.2d at 246.
110. Id. at 196-97, 656 P.2d at 246-47.
111. Id. If reasoning from decisions regarding the Workers' Compensation Act is applicable to
tolling of the time period, see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text, it appears that the period
must be tolled if the injured person is incompetent and is not legally represented. See Montell v.
Orndorff, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680 (1960) (the notice provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act does not expect the impossible of the claimant; notice is tolled for incompetence).
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). This section provides in relevant part:
A. Actions against a government entity or a public employee for torts shall be
forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years after the date
of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death, except that a minor under the full
age of seven years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file.
However, the minority exception only extends to living minors. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v.
Armijo, 103 N.M. 174, 704 P.2d 428 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 177, 704 P.2d 431
(1985). Actions for the wrongful death of an infant may not take advantage of the minority savings
clause. Id. at 176, 704 P.2d at 430.
Additionally, individuals bringing an action under the TCA for wrongful death are not required
to obtain court appointment of a personal representative for the action to lie. Chavez v. Regents
of Univ. of N.M., 103 N.M. 606, 711_P.2d 883 (1985). Further, should the legal status of a party
change after the limitations period, such as being appointed as a personal representative, the party
may submit an amendment to its pleadings that will relate back to the original complaint. Id. at
610-11, 711 P.2d at 887-88.
113. Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191, 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct. App. 1986); see also supra
notes 85-92 and accompanying text. The Act does provide a minority exception to the limitations
period that appears to modify this rule for infants. However, the statute of limitations is not tolled
during the pendency of a suit in federal court. A failure to prosecute is not excused by a simultaneous
suit in federal court arising from the same nexus of facts. Howell v. Anaya, 102 N:M. 583, 585,
698 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1985).
114. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 197, 656 P.2d 244, 247
(Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889 (1983).
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The Act's limitations period preempts any other general statute of
limitations. In Cozart v. Town of Bernalillo,"5 the Town of Bernalillo
challenged the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, to grant summary judgment."1 6 The town asserted that the
one-year limitation on actions against municipalities in New Mexico's
general limitation statute' 7 applied rather than the two-year limitation
provided by the TCA. "I8 The court of appeals reasoned that the town
was a local public body under the TCA and that the Act was the exclusive
remedy for claims brought against the government. 119 The court held,
therefore, that the New Mexico Legislature intended to bring all law
relevant to any claim against a government body within the Act. 120
the TCA two-year period
Regardless of other statutes of limitation,
12
controls in actions against a state entity. '
The functions of the statute of limitations and the notice provision
appear identical. Both are jurisdictional and both appear to satisfy the
state interest in avoiding stale claims and motivating the affected entity
to adequately investigate the occurrence giving rise to the claim.' 2 2 Both
may act as a bar to suit if a plaintiff has not met their requirements.
C. Damage Cap
The TCA's damage cap is an area of particular concern to claimants
sustaining catastrophic injury. This section provides a maximum liability
of $300,000 "to any person for any number of claims arising out of a
single occurrence . . . ," or $500,000 "for all claims arising out of a
single occurrence."' ' 23 Two recent cases addressed the definition of a

"single occurrence.

"124

In Folz v. State, plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages for
negligent control of traffic at a mountain-site construction project. 25 A
runaway truck's successive and separate collisions with multiple vehicles
resulted in death and serious injuries. 126 The jury granted a $651,686.85
judgment against the state, but the court entered judgment for plaintiffs
limited to a total of $500,000.127
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that each collision was a single
occurrence and, therefore, the statutory limit of $500,000 applied sep-

115. 99 N.M. 737, 663 P.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1983).
116. Id. at 738, 663 P.2d at 714.
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
118. Cozart, 99 N.M. at 738, 663 P.2d at 714.
119. Id. at 739, 663 P.2d at 715.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
124. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990); Folz v. State, 110
N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246 (1990).
125. Folz, 110 N.M. at 459-60, 797 P.2d at 248-49 ($500,000 is the total available for all claims
arising out of a single occurrence; $300,000 is the limit for a single claim).
126. Id.at 460, 797 P.2d at 249.
127. Id.
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arately to each collision. 128 The court of appeals disagreed, concluding
that plaintiffs' aggregate recovery must be limited to that provided in
the Act because plaintiffs' injuries all arose from a single occurrence. 29
1
The supreme court affirmed. 30
The TCA does not define "single occurrence." Comparing the limitation
on all claims of individual persons 3 ' with the limitation on total damages
for aggregate claims, 3 2 the supreme court in Folz concluded that the
number of injured persons did not determine the number of occurrences. 133
Likewise, the court decided that proximate cause alone, or the negligent
act or omission of the government entity alone, does not determine the
number of occurrences. 3 4 The court rejected the court of appeals' methodology and found that a proximate cause analysis does not provide for
successive acts of design or for implementation or supervision that may
also be causes of an alleged injury.' Rather, the court determined "single
occurrence" using a "triggering event" analysis. The number of unitary
risks created and the number of triggering events giving rise to the injuries
determine the number of occurrences. 3 6 The court held "that all injuries
proximately caused by the governmental agency's successive negligent acts
or omissions that combined concurrently to create a singular, separate,
and unitary risk of harm fell within the meaning of a 'single occurrence'
when triggered by the discrete event of one runaway truck.' 3 7 Hence,
despite the multiple collisions and injuries, there was only one occurrence
"because the collisions between the truck and each of the five vehicles
lay within the scope of consequences portended by [the government
entity's] negligence, and because the driver's loss of control was the
triggering event that brought this negligence to its tragic fruition."'3
In Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,39 a city employee negligently drove
a crane with negligently maintained brakes through a red light and collided
with a cement truck driven by Trujillo. 14 Trujillo obtained a $547,905.80
personal injury judgment. 141 The trial court determined that there were
two occurrences 142 and, therefore, the limit of liability was twice the
$300,000 cap for any person for any number of claims arising out of

128. Id. at 461, 797 P.2d at 250.
129. Id.

130. Id.
131. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (a total of $300,000 may be recovered

by any single individual arising out of a single occurrence).
132.
for all
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (a total of $500,000 may be recovered
claims arising out of a single occurrence).
Folz, 110 N.M. at 462, 797 P.2d at 251.
Id. at 462-63, 797 P.2d at 251-52.
Id. at 463, 797 P.2d at 252.
Id. at 465, 797 P.2d at 254.
Id.
Id. at 464, 797 P.2d at 253 (footnote omitted).
110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990).
Id. at 622, 798 P.2d at 572.

141. Id.

142. Id.
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a single occurrence.' 43 The court of appeals reversed.'" The supreme
court, consistent with Folz, upheld the court of appeals' reversal.' 45 The
city's negligent maintenance of the brakes produced a risk of harm that
was triggered by the employee's negligent operation of the crane. Thus,
the two negligent acts combined to produce a singular risk of collision,
and the crane's entry into the intersection was a singular triggering event. 4
D. Proper Party Defendants
Early cases involving the TCA struggled with who should be joined
as proper party defendants. Clearly, the Act provides that government
entities may be held liable for the negligence of their employees. 147 A
government entity is the state or any "local public body."' 4 A "local
public body" is defined as a political subdivision of the state and its

agencies and instrumentalities. 149 However, all waivers of immunity within
the TCA use the words "negligence of public employees."10 The Act,

therefore, seems to leave open the question of whether a government
entity can be sued directly.
Abalos v. Bernalillo County District Attorney's Office 5 ' confronted

the issue of whether a government entity can be a named party defendant. 52 In Abalos, a woman brought an action under the TCA for
personal injuries and damages resulting from her rape by an allegedly
negligently released prisoner. 53 The woman joined as defendants the
Bernalillo County District Attorney's Office, the Bernalillo County Detention Center, and several individual employees of both agencies. 5 4 The
court of appeals held that the agency or entity for whom a public employee
5
works may be joined as a proper party defendant.'

The court reasoned that the parties responsible for the alleged harm
should be the only named defendants. 5 6 Where an entity "has little direct
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 622-23, 798 P.2d at 572-73.
147. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). For an analysis of "public employee"
as opposed to "independent contractor," see Armijo v. Department of Health & Env't, 108 N.M.
616, 619-21, 775 P.2d 1333, 1336-39 (Ct. App. 1989).
148. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). A "body politic" is a local public body
and thus subject to the TCA. See Thompkins v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 96 N.M. 368, 370, 630
P.2d 767, 769 (Ct. App. 1981) (Carlsbad Irrigation District held a political subdivision of the state
and included within the Act).
149. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). The supreme court has reserved judgment
on whether a private corporation may be so meshed with government that it should be considered
merely an instrumentality of the government entity. Cole v. City of Las Cruces, 99 N.M. 302, 305,
657 P.2d 629, 632 (1983).
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-5 to -12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
151. 105 N.M. 554, 734 P.2d 794 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987).
152. Id.at 558, 734 P.2d at 798.
153. Id.at 556, 734 P.2d at 796.
154. Id.
155. Id.at 559, 734 P.2d at 799.
156. Id. The Abalos court found that the doctrine of respondeat superior was unnecessary in
order to impose vicarious liability upon a government agency. Yet, the supreme court has acknowledged that the Act itself embodies the doctrine. See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying
text.
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involvement, [forcing it to defend a suit] would be unduly burdensome
and unnecessary.' ' 7 Thus, the state or other entity may only be named
when there is evidence of wrongdoing on its part or when it has direct
supervisory responsibility for the employee sued. 5 s
In Silva v. State,"59 the supreme court expanded upon the Abalos ruling
regarding the relationship between the doctrine of respondeat superior
6 The supreme court also clarified the extent of the
and the TCA.1W
supervisory responsibility required of a government entity.
The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer may
be held responsible for damages caused by the negligent acts or omissions
of its employees. 161 The Silva court expressly accepted the doctrine. 62
"To the extent that prior cases have rejected the applicability of the tort
' 63
doctrine of respondeat superior . . .those cases are hereby overruled." '
Yet, a strict adherence to the doctrine would result in the state being
named in every suit brought under the Act. The court explained that to
be able to name a government entity as a party defendant a "right of
control" over the employee, whether that control is exercised or not,
must be present.164 To name the state as a defendant, the state must
65
have direct supervisory control over the employee.
The direct supervision rule, however, may not "defeat totally a claim
which otherwise has been brought under traditional concepts of respondeat
superior."'' While the doctrine of remoteness' 67 may be used by the
courts to avoid imposing liability upon the state,' 68the courts must also
avoid "inherently unfair and inequitable results.'
Application of respondeat superiorto claims against government entities
clearly benefits individual plaintiffs. A plaintiff may bring an action
against a government entity even though the plaintiff may not know
which specific employee committed the negligent act or omission. Further,
a jury might be less likely to allow recovery when deciding an action
against a single individual than when deciding an action against a named
institution. These practical aspects of the application of the doctrine
undergird the holdings in Abalos and Silva. 169
157. Id. The court indicated that the analysis behind the doctrine of remoteness is applicable to
questions of proper party defendants under the TCA. Id.
158. Id. The court held that "Sections 41-4-5 to -12 contemplate suing the immediate supervisory
entity of the public employee involved." Id. To name a particular entity there must be: (1) a
negligent public employee who meets one of the waiver exceptions under sections 41-4-5 to -12;
and (2) in entity that has immediate supervisory responsibilities over the employee. Id.
159. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
160. Id. at 477, 745 P.2d at 385 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. Id. (citations omitted).

163. Id.(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis in original).
167. The doctrine provides that employees and government entities that are "too remote" from
the negligent employee may not be held liable for damages. Id.
168. Id.
169. See also Wittkowski v. Corrections Dep't, 103 N.M. 526, 710 P.2d 93 (Ct. App.), cert.
quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), modified by Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist.
Attorney's Office, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987).
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III. ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED
Much of the litigation surrounding the Act arises from plaintiffs'
attempts to place their damages within a governmental activity for which
immunity is waived. Court resolution of these issues has depended largely
upon how the court construes the TCA. Notably, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals generally has taken a narrow, literal approach when construing
the Act. The New Mexico Supreme Court, on the other hand, interprets
the Act in light of its purpose, which often renders a much broader
construction. 7 0
In a seminal case, Methola v. County of Eddy,' 7' the supreme court
made it clear that "[s]ince the Act is in derogation of petitioner's common
law rights to sue respondents for negligence, the Act is to be strictly
construed insofar as it modifies the common law.' 72 Because general
governmental immunity is current law, altering the prior common law
that abolished sovereign immunity, statutory construction occurs only
when the courts are called upon to interpret one of the eight categories
of exceptions. The general immunity provisions can only be strictly
construed by giving a broad or liberal construction to the exceptions.
"The direction indicated by ... [the supreme] court ...

has been toward

a liberal, rather than a narrow construction [of the exception provisions]
'7
of the Act.'
The Methola court emphasized that interpretation of the Act must
begin with the legislative recognition of the "unfair and inequitable results
which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' '1 74 Still, the supreme court has struggled with balancing the
legislative intent of protecting the public treasury against the legislative
intent of mitigating the harsh results of a strict application of governmental
immunity. For example, the court gives a broad construction to the
exemption for negligence in the maintenance of highways, 75 but it construes other exemptions quite narrowly. 76 Each of the Act's exemptions
that have been construed by New Mexico appellate courts since the Act's

170. See, e.g., Miller v. New Mexico Dep't of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 254, 741 P.2d 1374, 1375
(1987) (issuance of permit for over-sized vehicle was "maintenance" of highway and within exception
to general immunity). In Miller, the court of appeals focused on the literal meaning of the exception
in question, while the supreme court looked to the object the legislature sought to accomplish and
the wrong it sought to remedy. Id. Because of the supreme court's broader interpretation, the
supreme court came to an entirely different conclusion than did the court of appeals.
171. 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
172. Id. at 333, 622 P.2d at 238 (citations omitted); see also Holiday Management Co. v. City
of Santa Fe, 94 N.M. 368, 369, 610 P.2d 1197, 1198 (1980) (narrow construction would be inconsistent
with remedial purpose set out in Hicks); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671, 675,
687 P.2d 728, 732 (1984) (the Act "is to be strictly construed to the extent that it modifies the
common law") (citation omitted).
173. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 58, 618 P.2d 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1980)
(citations omitted).
174. Methola, 95 N.M. at 331, 622 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted).
175. See infra notes 261-305 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
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inception through August 1990 are examined in the following sections.177
A.

Negligent Operation or Maintenance of a Motor Vehicle
The Act establishes a waiver of immunity for the negligent operation
or maintenance of motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft. 178 In Chee
Owens v. Leavitts Freight Service, Inc.,' 7 the court of appeals addressed
the meaning of "operation of a motor vehicle."
The parents of a student injured when a truck struck him as he crossed
a road to board a school bus brought an action naming, among other
defendants, two school districts and the State Transportation Division
of the State Board of Education (the "State" defendant).8 0 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and school district
defendants. 8 ' The court of appeals held that the trial court properly
dismissed the State defendant but improperly granted summary judgment
82
to the defendant school districts.
The plaintiffs asserted that the State defendant was negligent in enforcing the regulations it promulgated concerning student transportation," 3
but the court reasoned that the State had not waived its immunity under
the Act because "operation" meant that the vehicle in question must be
performing work. 8 4 The Act only grants a waiver of immunity for the
negligence of public employees in the operation of a motor vehicle, not
in the design, planning or enforcement of regulations.8 5 Because the State
defendants were not operating the vehicle at the time of the occurrence,
the State defendants were not liable. 8 6 On the other hand, the school
district defendants were directly responsible for the bus driver, who was
"operating" the bus within the contemplation of the Act. 8 7 Immunity
had been waived as to the bus driver.' 8 Thus, the school district was a
proper party defendant. 8 9
The school districts, however, were immune from suit for defects in
the design and planning of bus stops and for faulty enforcement of

177. New Mexico appellate courts have not yet construed section 41-4-7 regarding negligence in
the operation and maintenance of airports.
178. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
179. 106 N.M. 512, 514-15, 745 P.2d 1165, 1167-68 (Ct. App. 1987).
180. Id. at 513, 745 P.2d at 1166.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 515, 745 P.2d at 1168.
183. Id.

184. Id. at 514, 745 P.2d at 1167. Yet, where a woman brought an action for an injury arising
from the discharge of toxic substances when a fire department burned junk cars during a training
exercise, the fire department might be liable on a "maintenance" theory. The court held that "[tihe
maintenance of motor vehicles connotes the act of keeping them safe for public use. Certainly,
burning of automobiles is inconsistent with this concept." There was an issue of material fact as
to the negligence of the defendants precluding summary judgment. McCurry v. City of Farmington,
97 N.M. 728, 731, 643 P.2d 292, 295 (Ct. App. 1982).
185. Chee Owens, 106 N.M. at 515, 745 P.2d at 1168.
186.
187.
188.
189.
fact to

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516, 745 P.2d at 1169. But, whether the bus driver was negligent was a question of
be decided by the jury. Id.
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procedures. 190 Planning and design are part of the government's discretionary functions that have traditionally been granted immunity. Thus,
the court of appeals has continued the distinction between ministerial

and proprietary government acts. 19' Moreover, the court has narrowly
interpreted the term "operation" of a vehicle to mean that the vehicle
must be performing work.192 Plaintiffs are left with a host of unanswered
questions. 93
B.

Operation and Maintenance of Buildings, Public Parks,
Machinery, Equipment and Furnishings
A waiver of immunity is granted for the negligent operation or maintenance of buildings, public parks, machinery, equipment or furnishings., 94
As noted by the supreme court, this provision was adopted to "ensure
the safety of the general public by imposing upon public employees a
duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining premises owned and
operated by governmental entities."'' 9 The Act does not, however, grant
a waiver for negligent design, 96 negligent inspection, 97 or negligent su-

pervision. 98 This section has been interpreted as a waiver of immunity
primarily in situations where liability arises from an accident on government premises.199

This section also imposes liability for the negligent operation or maintenance of building grounds. For example, an operator of a countyowned public housing project may be liable for injuries to a minor invitee
caused by a bite from a loose-running dog. 200 Relying upon the legislative
intent to ensure that buildings and property owned and operated by the
government are kept safe for the public's use, the supreme court held
in Castillo v. Santa Fe County that the common grounds of a public
housing project fall within the definition of "building" for the purposes

of a waiver of governmental immunity. 20' The court then interpreted

190. Id. at 515, 745 P.2d at 1168.
191. See, e.g., id.at 512, 745 P.2d at 1165.
192. Id. at 514, 745 P.2d at 1167.
193. Unanswered questions include: is negligent parking of a vehicle, resulting in injury, granted
a waiver of immunity under the Act? Or, must the vehicle be in motion for plaintiff recovery?
194. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
195. Castillo v. Santa Fe County, 107 N.M. 204, 206, 755 P.2d 48, 50 (1988).
196. Rivera v. King, 108 N.M. 5, 12, 765 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Ct. App.) (negligent design of a
building does not come within exception to immunity), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758
(1988).
197. Martinez v. Kaune Corp., 106 N.M. 489, 491, 745 P.2d 714, 716 (Ct. App.) (immunity is
not waived for negligent inspection of a dairy farm or food store), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 439,
744 P.2d 912 (1987). The court noted that to extend liability to the state for all activities licensed
or inspected by state agencies would be too pervasive. Id. at 492, 745 P.2d at 717.
198. Pemberton v. Cordova, 105 N.M. 476, 734 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1987) (immunity is not
waived for negligent supervision resulting in one student striking and injuring another student). A
school district is also not liable when teachers supply drugs to students. Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun.
School Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 448, 744 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1987).
199. Schleft v. Board of Educ., 109 N.M. 271, 273, 784 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
109 N.M. 232, 784 P.2d 419 (1989).
200. Castillo v. Santa Fe County, 107 N.M. 204, 755 P.2d 48 (1988).
201. Id. at 206, 755 P.2d at 50.
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maintenance as "the care and upkeep of something ' 20 2 and emphasized
the importance of keeping public areas safe. 20 3 The court noted that
"under the right circumstances, loose-running dogs could represent an
unsafe condition upon the land." 204 Therefore, the landlord was under
a duty to maintain205in a safe condition those areas of the property reserved
for common use.
Similarly, in Schleft v. Board of Education, a child and his parents
named the Board of Education of Los Alamos as a defendant in a
negligence action in which they sought to recover damages for injuries
the child sustained when he climbed a transformer platform on school
grounds and came into contact with an uninsulated wire. 206 The court
of appeals held that the building exception of the TCA applied to
maintenance of the school grounds as well as to maintenance of the
school building. 20 7 The court said "[tjhe term 'maintenance' involves more
than simply performing repairs; it includes keeping an area in a safe
condition.' '208 Thus, even though the transformer platform was located
on an easement over school grounds, the Board of Education had a duty
2° 9
to maintain everything on the school grounds in a safe condition.
The court of appeals' expansive interpretation of the term "maintenance" to include the grounds surrounding the building in question gives
one pause when compared with the court's narrow definition of the term
"operation" of a vehicle to mean that the vehicle must be performing
work. These contrasting definitions are perfect examples of the tension
that exists between the court's desire to allow plaintiffs to recover for
their injuries and the court's duty to enforce legislation as written and
to implement legislative intent.
C. Negligence in the Operation of Public Utilities
210
of
The Act provides a waiver of immunity for negligent operation
the following public utilities and services: gas, electricity, water, solid or
liquid waste collection or disposal, heating, and ground transportation. 21'
The Act does not grant a waiver of immunity for failure to provide an
it
adequate supply of gas, water, electricity or other services; nor does
212
substances.
toxic
or
irritating
of
discharge
the
for
waiver
grant a

202. Id.
203. Id. at 207, 755 P.2d
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. Schleft, 109 N.M. at
207. Id. at 273,. 784 P.2d
208. Id. at 274, 784 P.2d

at 51.
272-73, 784 P.2d at 1015-16.
at 1016.

at 1017.
209. Id. at 274-75, 784 P.2d at 1017-18.

210. "Operation" of a waste collection utility does not include inspection of a sewer line on
private property at the time of its construction. Adams v. Japanese Car Care, 106 N.M. 376, 743
P.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1987).
211. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-8(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). On the other hand, a fire department is

not a public utility. McCurry v. City of Farmington, 97 N.M. 728, 643 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1982).
212. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-8(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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Damage resulting from the negligent maintenance of a utility service
is actionable. In Holiday Management Co. v. City of Santa Fe,21 3 the
plaintiff filed suit against the City of Santa Fe for damages resulting
from the backup of waste from a clogged sewer.2 1 4 The trial court dismissed
the city and the plaintiff appealed. 215 The court of appeals affirmed the
216
trial court.
The question before the supreme court was not one of an adequate
supply of waste collection services, 217 but rather one of negligently maintained services. 218 A service may be a physical system within the meaning
of the Act. 21 9 The court noted that property owners pay an annual sewer
maintenance assessment, and the "failure to use or the improper use of
sewer maintenance funds was not intended to be swept under a governmental immunity rug. .. "220 The supreme court reversed the dismissal
by the trial court and the decision of the court of appeals and remanded
the, case for trial on the merits. 22'
A municipality is subject to the Act's waiver of immunity for the
negligent operation of a public utility even if the municipality's operation
of the utility is ultra vires. In Cole v. City of Las Cruces,2 n the plaintiff
brought an action against the city for negligent operation of a natural
gas utility. 223 An .explosion of a natural gas transmission line some ten
miles beyond the city limits injured the plaintiff. 24 The city argued that
its operation of the utility was outside its authority because the transmission line was outside the city limits. Thus, the city argued it was not
liable to the plaintiff because the city's operation of the gas transmission
line was unauthorized and was ultra vires.225 The court firmly rejected
the city's argument and held that the city's action came within the waiver
of immunity granted by the TCA. 226 The fact that the city acted outside
the scope of its authority did not immunize the city from suit. 227 Regardless
of its ultra vires actions, the city was operating a public utility, and the
228
actual site of the activity was immaterial.
Here, the supreme court added further substance to its definition of
"operation." Negligent operation is not dependent upon a government
entity's authority. If, in fact, the entity is actually operating a facility,

213. 94 N.M. 368, 610 P:2d 1197 (1980).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.

217. The court noted that an adequate supply of services is not granted waiver under the Act.
Id.
218. Id. at 369, 610 P.2d at 1198.
219. Id. at 370, 610 P.2d at 1199.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 369, 610 P.2d at
Id. at 370, 610 P.2d at
99 N.M. 302, 657 P.2d
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305, 657 P.2d at
Id.
Id. at 306, 657 P.2d at

228. Id.

1198.
1199.
629 (1983).
632.
633.
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i.e., the facility is performing work, the government entity is liable for
any negligence associated with that operation regardless of the site of
operation or the actual authority of the entity. Further, in Holiday
Management Co., the court showed little patience for mismanagement
of public funds resulting in injury when it broadly construed "services"
to include a physical system such as a sewer system.
D. Negligent Operation of Medical Facilities
The negligent operation of a variety of health care facilities is granted
a waiver of immunity under the TCA. 229 In Redding v. City of Truth
or Consequences,230 the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from the bite
of a vicious cat that was knowingly released into the community by the
city's animal control center. 23 The trial court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment, and on interlocutory appeal 232 the question before
the court was whether an animal control center fell within the definition
of a health care facility pursuant to the Act. 233 The plaintiff asserted
that the animal control center was a "like facility," and thus came under
the waiver of immunity granted by the health care facility waiver. 234 The
plaintiff also argued that the animal control center was established to
protect the health of the city's citizens, thus falling within the purpose
of this section to protect the health of citizens.
The court rejected both arguments. 235 The court reasoned that the
legislature intended the health care section of the Act to grant a waiver
of immunity for the negligent operation of facilities that provide health
care directly to people. 236 The court was not willing to read into the
statute language that was not there. 237 Immunity had not been waived
for the negligent operation of an animal control center.238
Moreover, the health care facility waiver of immunity only applies to
the extent that public employees operate one of the named health care
facilities. In Armijo v. Department of Health & Environment,239 the
plaintiff brought an action against Border Area Mental Health Center
and the Department of Health and Environment ("HED") for injuries
and death arising from the negligent release of her brother from a mental
health facility. 240 HED was responsible for the regulation of contractors

229. This section waives immunity for the negligent "operation of any hospital, infirmary, mental
institution, clinic, dispensary, medical care home or like facility." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-9 (Repl.
Pamp. 1989).
230. 102 N.M. 226, 693 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1984).
231. Id. at 227, 693 P.2d at 595.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 228, 693 P.2d at 596.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 108 N.M. 616, 775 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App. 1989).
240. Id. at 617, 775 P.2d at 1334.

Summer 1991]

NEW MEXICO

TORT CLAIMS ACT

providing mental health services3 4' Border Area Mental Health Center,
a private, non-profit entity that provided mental health services to Steven
Armijo under its contract with HED, released the plaintiff's brother for
the Easter holidays.2 2 While staying with his sister, he shot and killed
her husband and assaulted her and her minor daughter.343
HED was held to be immune from suit. 244 The court reasoned that
although HED contracted for the provision of services by Border Area
Mental Health Center, HED did not purport to regulate the practice of
mental health care.2 5 The actual clinical decisions of which plaintiff
complained were the exclusive prerogative of the center and its employees. 2" Noting that this section does not include the more liberally
defined term "maintenance," but only the more narrowly construed term
"operation," the court held that independent contractors u 7 were not
public employees and that HED did not "operate" the mental health
care facility in question. 24 Thus, the TCA did not provide an exception
to governmental immunity for HED's regulation of the center. 249
For a health care facility to come under this exemption, therefore, the
facility must directly provide health care to persons. And, the state must
actually be "operating" the facility and not just contracting with the
health care provider for health care services.
E.

Negligent Health Care
The negligent provision of health care by public employees is granted
a waiver of immunity under the TCA. 210 New Mexico courts have not
had an opportunity to construe what health care services may be covered
by this section,25 ' but the court of appeals has indicated that at least
one related service is not covered. An action against a state entity for
a wrongful autopsy is not granted a waiver of immunity.

241. Id. at 618, 775 P.2d at 1335.
242. Id. at 617, 775 P.2d at 1334.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Id. at 618, 775 P.2d at 1335.
246. Id.
247. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). This section excludes independent
contractors from the definition of "public employee," except for "licensed medical, psychological
or dental arts practitioners providing services to the corrections department," N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-4-3(E)(6), and "members of medical review boards, committees or panels established by the
board of the educational retirement association or the board of the public employees retirement
association." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(E)(7). The independent contractors at issue did not fall
within the above exceptions. Armijo, 108 N.M. at 620, 775 P.2d at 1337.
248. Armijo, 108 N.M. at 618-19, 775 P.2d at 1335-36.
249. Id. Nor may the operation of the state medical investigator's office be read into the exception
provided by section 41-4-9. Although the medical examiner is part of the medical profession, he
or she does not provide health care services. Begay v. State, 104 N.M. 483, 723 P.2d 252 (Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smialek v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d 1306
(1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1020 (1986).
250. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
251. The relationship between the TCA and the Medical Malpractice Act is problematic. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). While outside the scope of this article, it seems
that the differing schemes of the two statutes could well present equal protection problems.
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In Begay v. State,25 2 the relatives of a deceased Navajo Native American
brought an action against the state and the state medical investigator for
damages arising from emotional distress.253 Plaintiffs claimed that the
state performed an autopsy that violated traditional Navajo religious
beliefs without obtaining the consent of the next of kin. 254 The trial court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and plaintiffs appealed. 255 The
court of appeals held that the decision to perform the autopsy did not
involve health care, and, therefore, the waiver provided by this section
was inapplicable. 25 6 The court commented that the right to sue a government entity or a public employee is "limited to those rights and
conditions expressly presented" in the TCA. 2 7 Hence, the trial court was
correct in granting the state's motion to dismiss.258
This exemption of immunity for the negligent provision of health care
by public employees must, of necessity, be construed in light of the
exemption of immunity for the negligent operation of medical facilities.
Even if an entity such as the Office of Medical Investigation is part of
the medical profession, its activities may not come within the exemption
of immunity for the negligent provision of health care.
Negligent Maintenance or Existence of Highways and Streets
As noted above, the supreme court has narrowly interpreted the Act's
use of the term "operation. 25 9 By contrast, the court has broadly construed
the term "maintenance" in the immunity exception for negligent maintenance or existence of highways and streets. The Act waives immunity
for the negligent maintenance of or for the negligent existence of any 260
bridge, culvert, 261 highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking
area. 262 Defects in plan or design, as well as the failure to construct or
F.

252. 104 N.M. 483, 723 P.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smialek
v. Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d 1306, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1020 (1986).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 485, 723 P.2d at 254.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision allowing the siblings as party
plaintiffs and held that only the mother of the decedent had standing to bring suit. Smialek v.
Begay, 104 N.M. 375, 721 P.2d 1306, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1020 (1986).
259. See supra notes 229-49 and accompanying text.
260. The term "any" means "one or more, all." O'Brien v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
Dist., 94 N.M. 562, 566, 613 P.2d 432, 436 (Ct. App. 1980). Thus, the waiver of immunity granted
under this section is not limited only to the named structures, but also to related structures. Id.
Thus, immunity is waived even for a service roadway on a ditch bank. Id. at 567, 613 P.2d at
437.
261. Notwithstanding the TCA's prohibition of a waiver of immunity for injury or death arising
from community ditches or acequias, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1989), or arising
from the operation or maintenance of works used for diversion or storage of water, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989), a negligently maintained or built culvert with standing water
that results in the death of a minor child may qualify for a waiver of immunity. Retention of
water in the culvert might be the result of negligent maintenance, a question suitable for trial.
Tompkins v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 96 N.M. 368, 371-72, 630 P.2d 767, 770-71 (Ct. App. 1981).
262. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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reconstruct any of the named structures, are explicitly excepted from the
waiver of immunity. 263
Liability is not imposed for structures that are not in existence or for
structures that should be in existence. 264 Rather, a government entity is
liable only for those named structures that have already been built. 2 5 In
addition, the definition of "maintenance" of a highway includes the
installation and maintenance of appropriate signals, 2 " the maintenance
of a highway's fences,2 7 the presence or absence of guardrails, 261 and
the licensing of over-sized vehicles.26
In Grano v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc. ,270 the plaintiff sustained injuries
in an automobile accident occurring at the intersection of a city street
and a ramp to an interstate highway. 27 1 The plaintiff sued the City of
Albuquerque for failure to place traffic controls at an intersection that
was known to be dangerous because of increasing traffic. 272 The plaintiff
claimed that the placement of traffic controls came within the "maintenance" of a highway. 27 3 The district court denied the state's motion
for summary judgment. 274 On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed, construing "maintenance" to mean "the care or upkeep of
something.' '273 The court held that the absence of traffic signals is a
condition of a highway and is the subject of maintenance. 276 Thus, a
city may be held liable for accidents arising from the absence of appropriate traffic controls if there is an increase in traffic subsequent to
the completion of the design and the construction of the road. 277

263. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Application of immunity to planning
and designing a highway harkens back to the old distinctions between discretionary and proprietary
functions. Despite the legislative declaration that the Act abolishes these distinctions, the Act seems
to accommodate a goodly number of them. For a general discussion of these distinctions as they
relate to the Federal Tort Claims Act, see generally Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction: Variations
of an Old Idea, 11 AM. J. TwAL. ADvoc. 355 (1987).
264. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980).
265. Id. at 301, 621 P.2d at 518.
266. Grano v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 99 N.M. 227, 656 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433 (1983).
267. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980).
268. Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980).
269. Miller v. New Mexico Dep't of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987). New Mexico
courts have, however, limited their construction of the term "maintenance" to those items necessary
to guard the driving public. Loose-running dogs are not included in maintenance of a highway.
Smith v. Village of Corrales, 103 N.M. 734, 713 P.2d 4 (Ct. App. 1985) (action against village by
parent of school boy who was bitten by three dogs while he walked to school on public street),
cert. denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 (1986).
270. 99 N.M. 227, 656 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433
(1983).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 228, 656 P.2d at 891.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 227, 656 P.2d at 890.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.; see also Blackburn v. State, 98 N.M. 34, 36, 644 P.2d 548, 550 (Ct. App. 1982) (the
placement of a left turn signal is maintenance of equipment); Rickerson v. State, 94 N.M. 473,
476, 612 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980) (failure to
install traffic controls at dangerous intersection is negligent maintenance of equipment or furnishings,
as well as negligent maintenance of a highway).
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Further, failure to properly inspect and maintain a fence along a state
27
highway is actionable. In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Tucker, a
27 9
tractor-trailer sustained damage when it struck a cow on a public highway.
The plaintiffs sued the New Mexico State Highway Department alleging
that the department failed to maintain the highway's fence and that the
280 The
negligent maintenance was the proximate cause of the accident.
trial court dismissed the complaint against the state on the ground it
was immune under the TCA. 28 1 On appeal, the court of appeals held
immunity for the department's failure to
that the Act waived sovereign
22
properly maintain the fence. 1
The court noted that there is more to maintenance than just keeping
a road surface in good repair.28 3 The court emphasized that the legislature
intended to protect the traveling public and that the highway department
4
has a statutory duty to keep state roads safe. 21 The court of appeals
also explained that the interpretation of the TCA by the supreme court
tends toward a liberal rather than a narrow construction of the immunity
exemptions. 2 5 Because the primary purpose of the highway's fence was
to keep the road secure for the motoring public, the highway department
immune from liability for its failure to properly maintain the
was not
26
fence.
Moreover, the failure to install needed guardrails on an existing highway
imposes liability upon the responsible government entity. In Moore v.
State,28 7 the plaintiff was injured in a ten-foot fall when his motorcycle
was forced off a roadway. 288 The original plans for the roadway called
for the installation of guardrails. 28 9 However, no guardrails had been
installed. 290 The trial court found that the defendants were immune under
the TCA on the grounds that the government had only planned to install
a waiver of
guardrails and that the planning function was exempt from
29' The trial court granted summary judgment. 292
immunity.
293 The
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
court emphasized that the statute made a distinction between a highway
in existence and one not in existence; therefore, the legislature must have

278. 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980).
279. Id. at 57, 618 P.2d at 895.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.at 58, 618 P.2d at 896.
284. Id. at 59, 618 P.2d at 897. However, the presence of a statutory duty does not ensure that
a government entity can be successfully joined in an injury action. The alleged negligence of the
entity or its employees must still fall within one of the eight exceptions to the Act.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 60, 618 P.2d at 898.
287. 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1980).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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intended that highways in existence be made safe for the traveling public. 294
The court held that "the absence of guardrails was not a defect in design,
but a negligent omission ....,,295 But for the negligent omission, the
guardrails would have been installed. The state failed to follow
its own
296
plans, and immunity was waived for the state's omission.
In Miller v. New Mexico Department of Transportation,297 the plaintiff's
decedent was killed in a collision with a towed mobile home on a narrow,
winding road. 29 The plaintiff claimed that the Department of Transportation was negligent in issuing an over-sized permit for the mobile
home to be moved during a busy holiday weekend. 299 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the state defendant on the ground that
immunity had not been waived under the TCA. 3°° The plaintiff appealed.30
The court of appeals, accepting the narrow definition of "maintenance"
of a highway as physical upkeep, affirmed.3 0 2
The supreme court, declining to hold that maintenance of a highway
is limited only to physical upkeep, found that the authorization of oversized vehicle travel was not granted immunity under the TCA. °3 The
court reasoned that highways must be maintained in a manner ensuring
the safety of the motoring public, and creating a dangerous condition
3 °4
on a highway was contrary to the department's statutory mandate.
Thus, maintenance of a highway includes the issuance of an over-sized
permit.305
The court of appeals has interpreted "maintenance" of a highway to
mean maintenance of items associated with the structure of the highway,
such as guardrails and traffic signals. The supreme court, on the other
hand, has given a much broader interpretation to "maintenance" of a
highway by holding that the issuance of over-sized permits is "maintenance." The case law regarding this exemption best typifies the supreme
court's insistence that the exemptions to the Act be broadly construed.
G. Negligent Law Enforcement
Individuals who sustain personal injury, bodily injury, wrongful death
or property damage resulting from a variety of behaviors on the part

294. Id. at 302, 621 P.2d at 519.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 106 N.M. 253, 741 P.2d 1374 (1987).
298. Id. at 254, 741 P.2d at 1375.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Thus, the court of appeals was willing to impose liability for failure to properly maintain
a highway's fence, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 95 N.M. 56, 618 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1980),
and for negligent omission of guardrails, Moore v. State, 95 N.M. 300, 621 P.2d 517 (Ct. App.
1980), but balked at the notion that allowing an oversized vehicle on a busy highway was maintenance
of that highway. Both Tucker and Moore addressed aspects of physical upkeep.
303. Miller, 106 N.M. at 255, 741 P.2d at 1376.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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of law enforcement officers may bring suit against the officer and the
government entity responsible for the officer's conduct.2° Interestingly,
this section of the Act is the only exception to governmental immunity
that allows for an action based on personal injury. All other exceptions
allow suit only for bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage.
The legislature appears to provide an action for emotional distress under

the rubric of "personal injury."
The definition of "law enforcement officer" is the critical question in
much of the litigation surrounding this waiver of immunity. If the person
causing the injury is not a law enforcement officer, no state liability
exists under this exemption. A law enforcement officer is one whose
primary duty is to keep others in custody. 10 If a law enforcement agency's
employee does not keep others in custody, then any negligence by that

employee is immune from suit.30 8 The tension between protecting the
public treasury and compensating tort victims is clearly identifiable in
court decisions concerning this crucial definition. Indeed, with regard to
this section, the supreme court has abandoned its liberal construction of

the exemptions to the Act for a narrower, more state-protective stance.

For example, in an early case, Wittkowski v. CorrectionsDepartment °9
the court of appeals held that the warden of the state penitentiary was
immune from suit because he was not a law enforcement officer. Exempting the chief officer of the penitentiary from suit while allowing
suit against penitentiary guards calls into question whether the doctrine
of respondeat superior is as applicable to law enforcement agencies as

it is to other state entities.310 Moreover, the supreme court has allowed
the old distinctions between governmental proprietary and ministerial or

discretionary functions3" ' to creep back into New Mexico jurisprudence
in its decisions regarding this immunity exemption. Administrative officials, such as the Secretary of Corrections and the warden of the state
penitentiary, who arguably have policymaking responsibilities, are not
included within the definition of "law enforcement officer" even though
they may be employed by the Corrections Department.3 12 District attorneys,

306. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). Specifically, this section allows an action
for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, defamation of character, violation of property rights, or deprivation of federal or state
constitutional rights caused by law enforcement officers while acting within the scope of their duties.
307. Wittkowski v. Corrections Dep't, 103 N.M. 526, 710 P.2d 93 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed,
103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), modified on other grounds sub nom. Abalos v. Bernalillo
County Dist. Attorney's Office, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. However, the Abalos decision modified Wittkowski, at least to the extent that respondeat
superior makes the state liable for injuries arising from the actions of law enforcement officers.
The courts have not considered whether Abalos changes the decision that the warden of the state
penitentiary is not a law enforcement officer.
311. Discretionary or policymaking functions are ministerial, while operation of a municipal
swimming pool or maintenance of city streets are considered proprietary functions.
312. Anchondo v. Corrections Dep't, 100 N.M. 108, 110, 666 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1983) (the court
will look at the character of a person's employment in order to determine whether he or she is a
law enforcement officer, rather than look at the place of employment); see also Wittkowski v.
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who clearly possess discretionary responsibilities, are also not law enforcement officers and are immune from suit. 3"
Jailers, including the director of a detention center, are law enforcement
officers and may be sued for their negligent performance of their duties.
In Methola v. County of Eddy, 14 the county, county commissioners,
sheriff and deputies were sued for injuries sustained by a jail inmate
when he was attacked by other inmates." 5 The plaintiff prevailed at trial,
and the government defendants appealed.31 6 The court of appeals found
directions
that the defendants were immune from suit and remanded1 with
7
to the trial court to enter judgment for the defendants.
On certiorari, the supreme court based its decision upon the traditional
concepts of negligence as outlined in the Act." ' The court defined the
term "caused by" to mean negligent acts of omission as well as commission.319 Thus, the court concluded that the legislature intended to
include those acts enumerated in the law enforcement exemption that
occurred by reason of negligence as well as those acts that occurred as
a result of purpose or intention. 20 The court noted that when one assumes
the custodial care of another, one also assumes a duty to exercise care
for the protection of the one in custody. 2 ' The court held that the
government entities and public employees who were involved were not

immune. 322
Law enforcement officers have a duty to exercise the standard of care
employed by reasonable law enforcement officers in any activity within
the scope of their duties. In Cross v. City of Clovis,3 23 the father of a
thirteen-year-old boy brought suit against the city for the wrongful death
of his son, who was fatally struck by a stolen automobile after it crashed
through a police roadblock. 24 The boy had stopped some distance from
the roadblock to watch the action. a25 The father claimed that the officers

Corrections Dep't, 103 N.M. 526, 710 P.2d 93 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d
1047 (1985), modified on other grounds sub nom. Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Attorney's
Office, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987); Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987),
modified on other grounds, Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Attorney's Office, 106 N.M. 35, 738
P.2d 907 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Rivera v. King, 107 N.M. 785, 765 P.2d 758 (1988).
313. Abalos v. Bernalillo County Dist. Attorney's Office, 105 N.M. 554, 561, 734 P.2d 794,
1001 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 35, 738 P.2d 907 (1987) (action that results in negligent
release of a prisoner who later rapes a woman does not rise to a duty "to hold in custody"); see
also Candelaria v. Robinson, 93 N.M. 786, 606 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1980) (actions taken under a
district attorney's scope of duties are immune).
314. 95 N.M. 329, 622 P.2d 234 (1980).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 330-31, 622 P.2d at 235-36.
317. Id.
318. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
319. Methola, 95 N.M. at 333, 622 P.2d at 238.
320. Id.; see also Miera v. Waltemeyer, 95 N.M. 305, 621 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1980) (battery
committed by a police officer is actionable).
321. Methola, 95 N.M. at 333, 622 P.2d at 238.
322. Id. at 334, 622 P.2d at 239.
323. 107 N.M. 251, 755 P.2d 589 (1988).
324. Id. at 252, 755 P.2d at 590.
325. Id.
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failed to maintain a proper lookout and neglected to warn his son of
the approaching danger.3 26 The district court directed a verdict for the
city. 327 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's verdict,3 28 but the
supreme court reversed and remanded. 329 The supreme court held that
officers maintaining a roadblock have a duty to exercise ordinary care
of that duty and proximate
for the safety of others. 330 The issues of33breach
1
cause must be submitted to the jury.
Moreover, a failure to respond to a call reporting a crime in progress
and requesting assistance may be a breach of the duty owed by law
32
enforcement officers. In Schear v. Board of County Commissioners,
the supreme court held that a law enforcement officer may be held liable
for injuries that he or she did not directly cause.333 The plaintiff in
Schear suffered a brutal rape and torture. 33 4 The plaintiff alleged that
the police department failed to respond to a call reporting a crime in
progress and requesting assistance and that the department's negligence
resulted in her injuries. 33" The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.33 6 The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal.33 7
On appeal, the state defendants argued that while the police may have
a general duty to the general public, i.e., a "public" duty, no corresponding duty exists to a specific member of the public, i.e., a "special"
duty. 338 The supreme court held that no distinction may be made between
the "public" and "special" duties of government employees. The "public
duty" 33 9 distinction was "too closely linked to the concept [of] sovereign
immunity ... to have been included by the legislature within the meaning
of 'traditional tort concepts of duty. ' ' ' 340 The negligent performance of
law enforcement duties, regardless of whether the duty is owed to a
or to the public at large, is not granted immunity under
specific person
341
the Act.

326. Id.
327. Id. at 251, 755 P.2d at 589.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 253, 755 P.2d at 591. The court set out the standard of care owed by police officers
in the performance of their duties very nicely. As the risk of danger increases, the amount of care
likewise increases. Id. at 254, 755 P.2d at 592.
331. Id.
332. 101 N.M. 671, 687 P.2d 728 (1984).
333. Id. at 673, 687 P.2d at 730.
334. Id. at 672, 687 P.2d at 729.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. The concept of "public" duty embraces the notion that where the government owes a duty
of care to the general public, there is no corresponding duty to each individual that makes up the
general public. Thus, police traditionally could not be held liable for failure to protect any particular
member of the public.
340. Id. at 673, 687 P.2d at 730.
341. Id.at 676-77, 687 P.2d at 733-34.
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Thus, the scope of liability of law enforcement personnel is larger than
the liability imposed by the other exemptions to immunity in the Act.
The law enforcement exemption to governmental immunity applies to
any government employee whose primary duty is keeping persons in
custody. Such an employee is a law enforcement officer for the purposes
of this exemption. Policemen and jailers come within the Act's waiver
of immunity for negligent performance of their duties. Further, policemen
may be liable for their failure to respond to a citizen's request for
assistance with a crime, in progress.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Both the constitutionality of the TCA itself and the constitutionality
of its damage caps have been challenged. These challenges, brought under
both the United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution,
allege that the Act and the damage caps distinguish between classes of
tort victims in a manner that is constitutionally impermissible.
The Act allows recovery only for those tort victims whose injuries fall
within one of the eight exemptions to governmental immunity granted
by the TCA. Thus, the Act distinguishes between victims of private torts
and victims of -torts caused by government employees. The constitutional
attack on the entire Act was based on the notion that this kind of
classification of tort victims violates due process and equal protection.
The damage caps allow recovery to a set amount. Thus, the damage
caps classify government tort victims into those who may be made whole
because their damages are equal to or less than the maximum recovery
allowed, and those victims who cannot be made whole because their
damages exceed the maximum recovery permitted. The challenge to the
damage caps was also based on due process and equal protection grounds.
Constitutionality of the TCA
The United States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution provide that no one shall be denied due process of law or the equal protection
of the laws.3 42 Legislation that on its face or in its application produces
disparity between groups of individuals, has no justifiable compelling
state interest, and has no rational relationship to a government objective,
has traditionally been held suspect. Prior to the legislature's enactment
of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, victims injured by reason of
government negligence had a common law right to seek redress in the
courts.34 3 Thus, the TCA modified existing common law. While the
legislature may constitutionally abolish or alter the common law, the
A.

342. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
343. Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975). "[T]he right to sue is a 'species of
property."' Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)). Protection of this "property right" is focused "on assuring access
to fair procedures for its prosecution." In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig.,
820 F.2d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 1987).
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abolition or alteration of existing common law can only be accomplished
in a manner consistent with the due process rights of claimants adversely
affected by the change.3"
The New Mexico Supreme Court has noted the correspondence in
meaning and purpose between the principles of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution and of the New
Mexico Constitution .14 New Mexico courts interpret the equal protection
and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions similarly.'"
The standards for a violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses of both constitutions are the same.347
The analysis of a violation of equal protection and due process rights
involves a three-tier standard of review: determining whether a statute
is subject to strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, or simply rational basis
review. If the statute impinges upon a fundamental right or invidiously
discriminates against a suspect class, the strict scrutiny test applies, and
the statute will be held unconstitutional '34
unless
the statute is "necessary
8

to promote a compelling state interest.

The United States Supreme Court established an intermediate test of
heightened scrutiny in the early 1970's. 349 A permissible "[c]lassification

must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." 350
Lastly, the most flexible standard of judicial review is the rational
basis test. This test requires a legislative classification to have a rational
basis that treats with uniformity all persons within the class.35 ' If a
rational basis exists for the enacted statute and the statute is framed so
as to embrace equally all who may be in like circumstances, the legislative
classification is constitutionally permissible.35 2 New Mexico appellate courts

344. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 195, 686 P.2d 244, 245
(Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889 (1983).
345. Board of Trustees v. Montano, 82 N.M. 340, 482 P.2d 702 (1971).
346. Chapman v. Luna, 102 N.M. 768, 701 P.2d 369 (1985).
347. Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1980). However, even though the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
have been interpreted similarly, they nevertheless constitute independent rights and protections.
Chapman, 102 N.M. at 768, 701 P.2d at 369; see Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621,
798 P.2d 571 (1990) (analysis of state constitutional claims differs from that of United States
constitutional claims).
348. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); see McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308,
310, 540 P.2d 238, 240 (1975).
349. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
350. Id. at 76 (citation omitted); McGeehan, 88 N.M. at 310, 540 P.2d at 240.
351. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77; State v. Pate, 47 N.M. 182, 187, 138 P.2d 1006, 1009 (1943).
352. See also Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (those
similarly situated must be treated alike); Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Educ. of the Santa Fe
Pub. Schools, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1984) (absent a classification that is suspect
or a statute which touches upon fundamental rights, the test is whether the classification is reasonable);
Airco Supply Co. v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 68 N.M. 195, 360 P.2d 386 (1961) (statute must
operate uniformly upon all members of a legislatively created class).
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employed the rational basis test in resolving the due process and equal
protection challenges to the Act.
The constitutionality of the TCA was challenged on due process and
equal protection grounds shortly after its enactment. In Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education,"' a student and his parents
brought a personal injury action against the board of education and a
teacher after the teacher struck the student .1 4 The district court dismissed
the complaint based on the governmental immunity provided to the
defendants by the TCA because the injury did not fall within any of
the exemptions in the Act.355 On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the
Act violated the equal protection clauses of both the New Mexico and
federal constitutions. The plaintiff claimed that the TCA created a classification scheme that prohibited liability in most, although not all, of
the areas of government activity. Thus, the TCA arbitrarily discriminated
among persons injured by a government entity or employee.33 6 The court
the equal
of appeals disagreed and held that the TCA did not violate
57
protection clause of the federal or the state constitutions.
The court noted that unless a statute impedes fundamental rights or
is based upon inherently suspect classifications, such as race, religion,
or alienage, the statute is presumptively constitutional.35 Absent a statute
that compromises fundamental rights or that is based upon suspect classifications, judicial scrutiny of the statute requires only that the classification scheme within the statute be "rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 3 5 9 The court found that the TCA did not offend any
fundamental rights or discriminate against any suspect classes.3 60 Thus,
the court resorted to an examination of whether the Act was "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." '3 61 The court considered the goals
of protecting the public treasury, enabling the government to function
without the threat of time and effort devoted to legal actions, and
permitting the government to provide financially unprofitable but essential
services to be legitimate state interests justifying partial governmental
court held that the TCA is a constitutionally
immunity.3 62 Thus, the
3 63
permissible enactment.
Another attack on the statute resulted from a suit brought by Betty
Ferguson against the state, the State Highway Commission, and the

353. 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1980).
354. Id. at 392, 622 P.2d at 700.
355. Id.
356. Id.at 393, 622 P.2d at 701.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. (citations omitted) (the court did not employ the middle tier of review as developed in
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
360. Garcia, 95 N.M. at 394, 622 P.2d at 702.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. However, the notice of claim requirements, as applied to an infant, have been held
unconstitutional. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text. Further, Trujillo v. City of
Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990), appears to have undermined the Garcia holding
to some extent. See infra notes 376-93 and accompanying text.
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Valencia County Board of Commissioners. Ms. Ferguson brought the
suit on behalf of Robert Schlueter and others to recover for injuries and
death resulting from an automobile accident. 3' The district court dismissed
the suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to comply with
the
3a
notice provisions of the Act.3 65 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act itself,
as well as the notice provisions of the Act.3 67 The court of appeals
reversed the district court but failed to analyze the plaintiffs' constitutional
claims . a68 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on the ground
that plaintiffs failed to meet the notice requirement, but remanded to
the court of appeals for a consideration of the constitutional claims of

the plaintiffs

369

On remand, the court of appeals held that the TCA was constitutional.370
The plaintiffs asserted that the TCA denied the equal protection guarantees
of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions because the classification of activities for which liability could be imposed was arbitrary
and unreasonable, and because poor government entities could assert
immunity if they could not afford insurance. 37a The court relied upon
Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education72 and held
that the TCA did not violate the equal protection clauses of the federal
373
and state constitutions.
New Mexico courts have traditionally employed the rational basis test
for constitutional analysis of the Act. 374 Notably, the supreme court
recently declared that the intermediate test of heightened scrutiny is the
appropriate test for constitutional challenges to the Act's damage cap.375
This decision may well be a signal that the calculus is changing sufficiently
to justify a fresh constitutional challenge to the TCA itself.
B. Damage Cap
The TCA's damage cap is an area of concern particularly to claimants
sustaining catastrophic injury. This section provides a maximum liability
of $300,000 "to any person for any number of claims arising out of a

364. Ferguson v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 99 N.M. 194, 656 P.2d 244 (Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 226, 656 P.2d 889 (1983).
365. Id. at 195, 656 P.2d at 245.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.; see also New Mexico State Highway Comm'n v. Ferguson, 98 N.M. 680, 681, 652 P.2d
230, 231 (1982) (the court held that a state police report of the accident did not constitute written
or actual notice to the affected government entity and thus plaintiffs failed to comply with the
TCA notice provisions; however, the court remanded the constitutional issues raised by plaintiffs
for consideration by the court of appeals).
370. Ferguson, 99 N.M. at 195-97, 656 P.2d at 245-47.
371. Id.
372. 95 N.M. 391, 622 P.2d 699 (1980).
373. Ferguson, 99 N.M. at 196, 656 P.2d at 246.
374. See supra notes 353-73 and accompanying text.
375. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990).
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single occurrence," or $500,000 "for all claims arising out of a single
occurrence.' '376 Two recent cases addressed whether the damage cap is
unconstitutional. 377
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque 71 concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of the Act's damage caps. Trujillo brought the challenge
under the New Mexico Constitution rather than under the United States
Constitution.3 79 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion
that the damage cap violated Trujillo's right to equal protection under
the federal and state constitutions by creating an unreasonable and arbitrary classification between tort victims who could be fully compensated
by an amount within the statutory cap and those tort victims who could
not be fully compensated within the damage limits.38 0
The supreme court, departing from the Ferguson rational basis analysis,"' concluded that analysis of the damage cap's constitutionality called
32
for intermediate scrutiny under the New Mexico Constitution. The court
recognized that the damage cap implicated the constitutional right of
access to the courts, a fundamental right requiring a higher standard of
38 3
scrutiny than the scrutiny afforded by the rational basis test. The nature
of the individual interest involved and the character of the legislative
determine the level of scrutiny to be applied in any given
classification
38 4
case.
Further, the court emphasized the importance of tort compensation in
modern society and the necessity of guarding against "the rights of
particular classes of tort victims be[ing] sacrificed to social expediency
in the legislative process." 38' 5 The legislature may not "disregard lightly
the important and substantial individual interests served by the recovery
of tort damages. ' 38 6 Particularly, the principle of equal access to the
courts limits the power of the legislature. 7
Because intermediate scrutiny places the burden of proof upon the
government to show a substantial government interest and the nonexistence of less restrictive alternatives, fundamental fairness required the
388
court to give warning to the government before imposing such a burden.
The facts were not sufficiently developed below to allow a determination
of whether there was a substantial relationship between the classification

376. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
377. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 621, 798 P.2d at 571; Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246

(1990).
378. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 621, 798 P.2d at 571 (1990).
379. Id. at 623, 798 P.2d at 573.
380. Id.
381. See supra notes 353-75 and accompanying text.
382. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 623, 798 P.2d at 573.
383. Id. The court based its reasoning on Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, 107 N.M.
688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988) (dramshop damage cap unconstitutional).
384. Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 626, 798 P.2d at 576.
385. Id. at 624, 798 P.2d at 574.
386. Id. at 625, 798 P.2d at 575.
387. Id.
388. Id.at 630, 798 P.2d at 580.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

and the state's interest.38 9 Therefore, the court remanded to the trial court
for further factual findings in order to permit the government to meet
its burden of proof and to develop an adequate record on the constitutional
question. 90
Although the constitutional question is still unresolved, the Trujillo
decision nonetheless marks a turning point in the supreme court's analysis
of the Act. The rational basis test is "largely toothless" because statutes
are almost always declared constitutionally valid when the test is used.3 9'
On the other hand, strict scrutiny is "nearly fatal" because few statutes
can comply with the demand that the classification imposed by the statute
be justified by a compelling government interest. 92 Intermediate scrutiny
allows "for a more flexible accommodation of legislative purposes," but
it does not "abandon totally the concern with over- and under-inclusiveness that ... is given form as the least restrictive alternative test.' 393
With Trujillo, the supreme court may be signalling its willingness to
reconsider the TCA in light of state constitutional mandates, and, at
least with some parts of the Act, to employ a higher standard of scrutiny
that may benefit claimants.
V.

THE TCA AND DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
While an exhaustive treatment of constitutional torts is beyond the
scope of this article, the relationship between the Act and a federal civil
rights action is worth comment. The following discussion is not definitive,
but rather is intended to give some idea of the problems inherent in
such actions and to lay out the relationship of the TCA to a civil rights
action.
A.

Section 1983, Employees, Officials, and Municipalities
The Civil Rights Act, title 42, section 1983, provides a cause of action
for the deprivation of any right secured under the federal constitution
or laws. 94 This statute provides a remedy against state and municipal
officials who illegally act in violation of federal constitutional or statutory

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.
Id. at 632, 798 P.2d at 582.
Richardson, 107 N.M. at 697, 763 P.2d at 1162 (citation omitted).
Id.
Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 629, 798 P.2d at 579.
This section provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). Section 1983 actions are complex. See Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The
Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 8 S.CT. REV. 281 (1980); Note,
Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil Rights Claims: Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fairness,
38 VAND.

L. REV. 1543 (1985).
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law.3 95 An action for the deprivation of federal rights may be brought,
in some circumstances, against a municipality. 39 If a government employee
inflicts a constitutional injury when executing "a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, . . . the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.''397 Municipal liability attaches to
"acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered"3 9 and
where "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from
among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing the final policy with respect to the subject matter in quesfor
tion. ' 399 Whether a government employee is a final policymaker
4
00
law.
state
of
matter
a
is
action
1983
section
purposes of a
Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials and
employees in their personal capacities from liability for actions that do
4
not violate clearly established law. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,0 the United
States Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
42
constitutionalrights of which a reasonableperson would have known."
Qualified immunity only protects public officials "as long as their actions
could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated." 403 Public officials' actions that violate clearly
established constitutional rights are not protected by the doctrine of
qualified immunity, nor are they protected in their official capacities."0
The application of qualified immunity, however, is a threshold question
45
and must be answered before any significant procedure has taken place.
Discovery will be delayed until the court has ruled on whether the
government official or employee is immune from suit in her personal
capacity.4

B.

395. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981); see Schuck, supra note 394; Note, supra note 394.

396. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978) (local governments are

included among the "persons"

to which section 1983 applies).

397. Id. at 694.
398. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).

399. Id. at 483-84.
400. Id. at 483.

401. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow established the defense of qualified immunity for government
employees in their personal capacities. Id. at 818.
402. Id. (emphasis added).
403. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (emphasis added).
404. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Furthermore, choice of forum in a section 1983 action must be
carefully planned. Employees, in their official capacities, of entities which are arms of the state,
and the entities themselves, may not be sued in federal court. For example, in New Mexico, school
districts are arms of the state and may not be sued in federal court. Martinez v. Board of Educ.
of Taos Mun. School Dist., 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984).
405. See generally Harlow, 457 U.S. 800.

406. Id.; see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Maxey by Maxey v. Fulton, 890 F.2d
279, 280 (10th Cir. 1989). Qualified immunity only insulates government officials from liability in
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Section 1983 and the TCA
The Act provides for a state cause of action based upon the deprivation
of constitutional rights by law enforcement officers.40 Otherwise, the Act
is silent regarding its relationship to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. This relationship, however, has arisen in a few New Mexico cases. 40 8
In Gallegos v. State,4 a former inmate of the state penitentiary sued
the state for injuries he sustained when he was assaulted by other inmates. 410 The action was brought under the TCA's waiver of immunity
for negligent operation or maintenance of any building.41 I The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. 412 The plaintiff appealed.41 3
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. 1 4 Although the court held
that the defendants were immune from suit under the TCA because an
attack by other inmates did not fit within the operation or maintenance
of a building, 4 5 the court noted that the TCA does not preclude an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for deprivation of rights
and privileges assured by the federal constitution or federal law. 41 6 The
court explained that the deprivation of constitutional rights is separate
and distinct from a tort and that "the federal remedy is supplemental
' 41 7
to the state remedy.
Further, the TCA two-year statute of limitations is inapplicable to
section 1983 actions. In Walker v. Maruffi, 418 the court of appeals decided
which statute of limitations should be applied to federal civil rights actions
filed in state court. 41 9 The Walker court noted it was bound by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court affecting federal law, 420 and in Wilson
v. Garcia,42' the United States Supreme Court held that the choice of
the applicable state statute of limitations in a section 1983 action was

an individual capacity, but has no effect on their liability in their official capacities. Universal
Amusement Co. v. Hofheinz, 646 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1981); Murphy v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp.
921 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (public employees sued in their individual capacities under section 1983 are
entitled to assert defense of qualified immunity).
407. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
408. For an excellent discussion of constitutional torts and their relationship to the TCA, see
Kovnat, Constitutional Torts and the New Mexico Torts Claims Act, 13 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1983).
409. 107 N.M. 349, 758 P.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. quashed, 107 N.M. 314, 757 P.2d 370
(1988).
410. Id. at 350, 758 P.2d at 300.
411. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
412. Gallegos, 107 N.M. at 350, 758 P.2d at 300.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 352, 758 P.2d at 302. The plaintiff might have been more successful if he had brought
the action under the exemption for law enforcement officers rather than the exemption for negligent
operation and maintenance of a building.
416. Id.
417. Id.; see also Wells v. County of Valencia, 98 N.M. 3, 6, 644 P.2d 517, 520 (1982).
418. 105 N.M. 763, 768, 737 P.2d 544, 549 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 707, 736 P.2d
985 (1987).
419. Id. at 764, 737 P.2d at 545.
420. Id. at 766, 737 P.2d at 547.
421. Id. at 768, 737 P.2d at 549 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (a state tort
claims act statute of limitations is inappropriate for civil rights actions and the state's general statute
of limitations governing personal injury actions should be applied)).
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a matter of federal law. Federal courts are to apply that state statute
of limitations that is most closely analogous to section 1983.422 Thus, the
limitations period to be applied is that found in New Mexico's general
statute of limitations because it is the one that governs those actions
most like section 1983 actions.4

not

apply.424

23

The TCA's statute of limitations does

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the supreme court's efforts to give the doctrine of sovereign
immunity a decent burial, the New Mexico Legislature resurrected it in
a form that continues to present definitional problems. The case law
developing around the TCA is largely devoted to construing and defining
the Act's exemptions. Injured claimants must come within one of the
Act's eight waivers of immunity before they may receive compensation
from the state.
In many cases, New Mexico appellate courts decided in favor of injured
plaintiffs. In some cases, the courts struggled with balancing the need
to protect the public treasury with claimants' needs for adequate compensation and opted to shield the state. The tension between the need
to protect the public treasury and the need to compensate tort victims
will be a continuing theme in future cases.
JAMIE McALISTER

422. Id.
423. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978) (providing for a three-year period in which to
bring suit).
424. Walker, 105 N.M.. at 768, 737 P.2d at 549.

